IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING SYSTEMIC RISK: AN
ASSESSMENT OF OUR PROGRESS *
Steven L. Schwarcz**

Although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of systemic risk,
the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling companies to directly access
the ultimate source of funds, the capital (i.e., financial) markets, without going through
banks or other financial intermediaries—is making these failures less critical than in the
past. While banks and other financial institutions remain important sources of capital,
companies today are able to obtain most of their financing through financial markets
without the use of intermediaries.1 As a result, financial markets themselves are increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk.
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The relationship between financial markets and systemic risk has been
dramatically illustrated by the recent financial crisis. Although the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers filled the initial headlines, the trigger of the crisis was the collapse of
the market for mortgage-backed securities. A significant number of these securities were
backed by risky subprime home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced
through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the borrowers
could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. These defaults in turn caused
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substantial amounts of investment-grade rated securities backed by these mortgages to
be downgraded and, in some cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in these
and other rated securities, and their market prices started falling.
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed securities, was
particularly exposed. Firms that had been doing business with Lehman—its
‘counterparties’—began demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not
provide. As a result, absent a government bailout, Lehman could not continue doing
business. The refusal of the Government to save Lehman Brothers, and Lehman’s
resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Securities markets became so panicked that
even the short-term commercial paper market virtually shut down, and the market prices
of mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the
mortgage assets underlying those securities.2
The collapse became a death spiral as banks and other financial institutions
holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their value under “mark-tomarket” accounting rules. This caused these firms to appear more financially risky, in
turn triggering widespread concern over counterparty risk. The high leverage of many of
these firms effectively required fire-sales of assets, exacerbating the fall in prices.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act prescribes many steps to attempt to prevent another
financial crisis, most of these steps focus on banks and other financial institutions, not on
financial markets. Such a limited focus worked well when banks and financial institutions were the primary source of corporate financing. But the financial crisis reveals that
this focus is insufficient now that companies obtain much of their financing directly
through financial markets—such as through securitization financing.3 Both financial institutions and financial markets can (if they fail) be triggers, and also transmitters, of
systemic risk.
REGULATORY APPROACHES TO SYSTEMIC RISK
So how should we regulate systemic risk? The primary (if not sole) justification
for regulating financial risk is the maximization of economic efficiency. Because
systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a central goal in its
2
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regulation. But systemic risk creates an added regulatory dimension: without regulation,
the externalities—harm to third parties—would not be prevented or internalized because
systemic risk is a risk to the financial system itself. Market participants are motivated to
protect themselves, but they are not as directly motivated to protect the system as a
whole.
As a result, there is a type of “tragedy of the commons,” a collective action
problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual
market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resources,
whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among
an even wider class of persons.4 Any regulation of systemic risk thus should focus not
only on traditional efficiency but also on the stability of the financial system.
In examining regulatory approaches to systemic risk, one should also take into
account the costs of regulation. There are direct costs, such as hiring government
employees to monitor and enforce the regulations. But more importantly there can be
indirect costs, such as overregulation that stifles innovation and competitiveness. Subject
to that caveat, a range of possible regulatory approaches, aimed at making the financial
system more efficient and stable, should be considered when assessing Dodd-Frank.
Averting Panics. The ideal regulatory approach would focus on eliminating the
risk of systemic collapse from the outset. This goal could be substantially achieved by
preventing financial panics, since they are often the triggers that commence a chain of
failures.5 The recent financial crisis itself, for example, was initially triggered by
financial market panic. But any regulation aimed at preventing panics that trigger
systemic risk would almost certainly fail to anticipate all the causes of the panics.
Furthermore, even when identified, panics cannot always be averted easily because
investors are not always rational.6
Requiring Increased Disclosure. Another potential regulatory approach is to
improve disclosure. Disclosing risks traditionally has been viewed, at least under U.S.
securities law, as the primary market-regulatory mechanism.7 Dodd-Frank puts great
stock in the idea of improving disclosure.8 Disclosure works by reducing, if not
4
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eliminating, asymmetric information among market players, making the risks transparent
to all. In the context of systemic risk, however, individual market participants who fully
understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily the
system as a whole. As a result of the aforesaid tragedy-of-the-commons, a market
participant may well decide to engage in a profitable transaction even though doing so
could increase systemic risk, since much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse
would be externalized.
Furthermore, the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing complexity of
transactions and markets.9 In the financial crisis, for example, there is little question that
most, if not all, of the risks regarding the complex mortgage-backed securities were
disclosed.10 Yet many institutional investors bought these securities based primarily on
their ratings, without fully understanding them. There are at least four reasons why
disclosure failed:
(i) Investors overrelied on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. Dodd-Frank
attempts to fix this problem by focusing on ratings, not on investors.11 However, the
actions of S&P and Moody’s arguably met the Act’s requirements, had those
requirements applied during the financial crisis. The real problem is not rating agency
failure but investor complacency. Because human nature cannot be easily changed, it is
unclear—and Dodd-Frank does not address—how investor complacency can be
remedied.
(ii) Investors followed the herd in their investment choices. Again, this is an
implacable problem of investor complacency.
(iii) Conflicts of interest were created by short-term management compensation
schemes, especially for technically sophisticated secondary managers.12 For example, as
the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk became more
accepted, financial firms began compensating secondary managers not only for
generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured by VaR.13
Thus, secondary managers turned to investment products with low VaR risk profile, like
credit-defaults swaps that generate small gains but only rarely have losses. The managers
124 Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (requiring additional disclosure from the Federal Reserve).
9
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knew, but did not always explain to their superiors, that any losses that might eventually
occur would be huge. This is an intra-firm conflict, quite unlike the traditional focus of
scholars and politicians on conflicts between senior executives and shareholders. DoddFrank attempts to fix the traditional type of conflict but completely ignores the problem
of secondary-management conflicts.14
(iv) The retention by underwriters of residual risk portions may have fostered
false confidence in buyers, in effect creating a mutual misunderstanding. Ironically, this
could be exacerbated in the future by Dodd-Frank’s requirement that sellers of
securitization products retain a minimum unhedged position in each class of products
they sell.15
Imposing Financial-Exposure Limits. The failure of one or more large and
interconnected institutions could create defaults large enough to de-stabilize other
highly-leveraged investors, increasing the likelihood of a systemic market meltdown.
This suggests another possible approach to regulation: placing limits on an institution’s
financial exposure. The following financial-exposure limits may be considered:
(i) First, the limitation of an institution’s leverage could reduce the risk of failure
of that institution in the first place. It could also reduce the likelihood of financial
contagion between institutions. However, limiting leverage can create significant costs
because some leverage is good, and there is no optimal across-the-board amount of
leverage that is right for every institution. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, directs the
Federal Reserve to set “prudential” capital standards for certain large financial
institutions,16 including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 15:1.17
(ii) Second, the limitation of an institution’s right to make risky investments could
reduce that institution’s downside risk. It is, however, a highly paternalistic approach,
substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm’s own business judgment. One
should be highly skeptical of any rule that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial
institution from itself. Dodd-Frank’s implementation of the Volker Rule, however,
attempts to do precisely that by limiting the ability of banks and certain other financial
institutions to engage in “proprietary trading”—essentially investing in securities for
14

Dodd-Frank’s attempt to fix the traditional conflict might actually backfire; recent research
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their own account.18
(iii) Third, the limitation of amounts of inter-institution financial exposure would
facilitate stability by diversifying risk, in effect by reducing the losses of any given
contractual counterparty and thus the likelihood that such losses would cause the
counterparty to fail. Limits might also reduce the urgency, and hence the panic, that
contractual counterparties feel about closing out their positions. This approach already
applies to banks through lending limits, which restrict the amount of bank exposure to
any given customer’s risk. Its application beyond banks to other financial institutions is
potentially appealing given the increasing blurring of lines between banks and non-bank
financial institutions and the high volumes of financial assets circulating among nonbank financial entities.
It is questionable, though, whether the government should impose financial
exposure limits on large financial institutions. These institutions have already tried to
protect themselves through risk management and risk mitigation. The financial crisis has
raised questions, however, whether conflicts of interest among managers and other
failures can undermine institutional risk management. Dodd-Frank addresses this
problem by requiring many large public financial firms to establish risk committees,
including at least one risk-management expert, responsible for enterprise-wide risk
management oversight.19
Limiting Financial Institution Size. This is related to financial exposure limits, but
this approach also addresses potential moral-hazard from institutions who believe they
are “too big to fail.” There is, however, no clear evidence of such risky behavior, and
financial institutional losses in the recent financial crisis can be explained by other
reasons.
Financial institution size should not be artificially limited. Size should be
governed by the economies of scale and scope needed for institutions to successfully
compete, domestically and abroad—so long as that size is manageable. We should watch
out, however, for institutions that increase their size, especially by acquisition of other
institutions, primarily to satisfy senior management egos. Dodd-Frank indirectly
addresses this concern (at least weakly) by linking senior executive compensation to
long-term results—for example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt standards whereby
listed companies implement policies to recoup senior executive compensation in the
event of an accounting restatement. 20
18
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Ensuring Liquidity. Ensuring liquidity could facilitate stability in two ways: by
providing liquidity to financial institutions in order to prevent them from defaulting, and
by providing liquidity to financial markets as necessary to keep them functioning.
The Federal Reserve Bank has had the role (under §13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act) of lender of last resort by providing liquidity to banks and other financial
institutions in order to prevent them from defaulting. 21 However, acting as a lender of
last resort to institutions can be costly. By providing a lifeline, a lender of last resort can
at least theoretically foster moral hazard by encouraging financial institutions—
especially those that believe they are “too big to fail”—to be fiscally reckless. It can also
shift costs to taxpayers since loans made to institutions will not be repaid if the
institutions eventually fail.
For these reasons, the Dodd-Frank Act sharply limits the power of the Federal
Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or insolvent financial institutions. 22 That
categorical limitation appears somewhat excessive, though; a lender of last resort can be
an important safeguard if it acts judiciously.
One way that Dodd-Frank attempts to avoid the need to make emergency loans is
by requiring banks and—to the extent designated as “systemically important”—other
financial firms to be subject to a range of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements23
and periodic “stress testing.” 24 It also requires these entities to submit a resolution plan
(a “living will”) that sets forth how, in the case of failure, the firm would wind down in a
way that minimizes systemic impact. 25 The intention behind these provisions is to
prevent failure and, if failure occurs, to mitigate the need for emergency loans by
allowing the firm to fail in an orderly manner. The ultimate question, though, will be
whether the ex ante plan matches the ex post reality.
Regardless of how one views a lender of last resort to financial institutions, the
financial crisis has shown that, in an era of disintermediation, more attention needs to
be focused on providing liquidity to financial markets as necessary to keep them
functioning. This approach should also be less costly than lending to institutions. A
market liquidity provider of last resort, especially if it acts at the outset of a market
panic, can profitably invest in securities at a deep discount from the market price and
still provide a “floor” to how low the market will drop.26 Buying at a deep discount will
21
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mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely that the market liquidity provider will be
repaid.
Reducing Complexity. An obvious way to address complexity would be to require
investments and other financial products to be more standardized, so market participants
do not need to engage in as much due diligence. One of the goals of Dodd-Frank is to
standardize more derivatives transactions. To this end, the Act requires many derivatives
to be cleared through clearinghouses,27 which generally require a high degree of
standardization28 in the derivatives they clear.29 The overall economic impact of
standardization is unclear, though, because standardization can interfere with the ability
of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when firms craft derivatives tailored to
particular needs of investors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Three regulatory initiatives that go beyond Dodd-Frank could address the
aforementioned concerns: (1) requiring that managers, including secondary managers, of
financial institutions be compensated based more on long-term firm performance; (2)
establishing a market liquidity provider of last resort; (3) requiring financial institutions
of systemic significance to contribute to a fund that would be used to mitigate systemic
externalities.
A market liquidity provider of last resort would have the best chance of
minimizing a systemic collapse under any number of circumstances. Chaos theory
supports the concept of a market liquidity provider of last resort. In complex engineering
systems, as in complex financial markets, failures are inevitable. Therefore modularity is
needed to break the transmission of these failures and limit their systemic consequences.
form of monetary policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve recently concluded a $600 billion
quantitative easing program of purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term
interest rates. See, e.g., Burton Frierson, Richard Leong, & Chris Reese, Federal Reserve Announces It
Will Conclude Quantitative Easing, HUFFINGTON POST, June 10, 2011, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/10/federal-reserve-plans-to-_n_875044.html. In contrast, the
task of a market liquidity provider of last resort (as contemplated by this article) would be much more
targeted: to prevent market collapses due to panic. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text
(explaining how a market liquidity provider of last resort would act).
27
Id. sec. 723(a), § 2.
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See Martin N. Baily et al., Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 4 (Squam Lake
Working Group on Financial Regulation, Working Paper, July 2009), available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Squam_Lake_Working_Paper5.pdf.
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that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2(h)(3). Further, the
clearinghouse requirement might inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the clearinghouses
themselves.
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Such a mechanism usually exists (or should exist) for banks, in the form of a liquidity
provider of last resort; we also need this type of mechanism for complex financial
markets.30
Recent experience in the financial crisis supports establishment of a market
liquidity provider of last resort. In response to the collapse of the commercial paper
market, the Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to
act as a lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary
liquidity distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that
could not otherwise sell their paper.31 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the
commercial paper market.32
This same approach can be applied more generally to respond to panic in
securities market. Say, for example, that the intrinsic value—effectively the present
value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a type of mortgage-backed
security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents on the dollar. If the market price of
those securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to 20 cents on the dollar,
the market liquidity provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on the
dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder of the
mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity provider could, for
example, agree to pay a higher “deferred purchase price” if the securities turn out to be
worth more than expected.33 This is just one (simplified) example of the flexible pricing
approaches used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain
value which could be adapted to a market liquidity provider’s purchases.34
One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a
deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors would not also
do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of governmental market liquidity
provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will not want to jeopardize
their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when other
30
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2008 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., Edward Elgar 2010), available at
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34
Alternatively, the market liquidity provider of last resort could attempt to stabilize the market by
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investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors usually
want to buy and sell securities, without having to wait for their maturities; whereas a
market liquidity provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary.
The third recommendation—to require financial institutions of systemic
significance to contribute to a systemic risk fund—responds to the tragedy-of-thecommons problem by helping to mitigate systemic externalities. This type of approach
was originally provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, but it was taken out before enactment
because of opposition by politicians who believed (perhaps wrongly) that it would
increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.35
A privately-funded systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic externalities
but also can help minimize the potential for risky behavior caused by institutions that
believe they are too big to fail. The too-big-to-fail problem is effectively an externality
imposed on government (and ultimately taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such
risky behavior. A privately-funded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that
externality. Furthermore, the ability of government to require additional contributions to
this type of fund should motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each other in order
to reduce the potential for such risky behavior.
Recently, the European Commission has been toying with the idea of a systemic
risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial sector.36 Although the
ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently unresolved, news reports indicate that an
originally contemplated use was a systemic risk fund.37 The IMF also appears to be
using the European Commission tax proposal as a platform to announce that “new taxes
on banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to
curb excessive risktaking.”38
The European Commission recognizes that in order to avoid making the EU
financial sector uncompetitive, any tax on the financial sector should be applied in all
financial centres. This illustrates a broader principle: because financial markets and
institutions increasingly cross sovereign borders, any regulatory approaches must be
designed to work in an international context. The Dodd-Frank Act does not, however,
35

S. Amdt. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010) (eliminating the proposed $50 billion dollar fund, financed by a
tax on banks, that would help wind down failed financial companies).
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European Commission, Taxation of the Financial Sector, a Communication from the Commission
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Committee of the Regions: (Brussels COM (2010) 549/5; SEC (2010) 1166).
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Commission Proposes a Bank Tax to Cover the Costs of Winding Down Banks that Go Bust (May
26, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/news/economy/100526_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
38
Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 8,
2010, at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by the IMF’s then-Managing Director
Dominique Strauss-Kahn).
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fully come to grips with how the U.S. financial regulatory framework should operate, or
even fit, as part of a global financial regulatory framework.
CONCLUSION
We have made some, but not nearly enough, progress in identifying and
managing systemic risk. Being a political response, Dodd-Frank consists largely of
politically targeted responses to the recent financial crisis, at times looking for villains
(whether or not they exist) who caused the crisis. To be most effective, however,
financial regulation must be situated within an analytical framework that realistically
explains how systemic risk is transmitted and why free-market factors do not limit that
transmission.39 The tragedy of the commons, for example, is certainly part of that
explanation.40
The Dodd-Frank Act nonetheless has the potential to ultimately reach beyond politically targeted responses. The Act delegates much of the regulatory details to administrative rulemaking, in many cases after the relevant government agencies engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential systemic threats
in order to find regulatory gaps. 41 The Council will be aided in this task by a newlycreated and, hopefully, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. 42 In these ways, regulators have the ability to look beyond the Act’s confines. This article has attempted to
provide ideas they might pursue.
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(arguing that the failures giving rise to the recent financial crisis can be attributed conceptually to at least
four market imperfections: conflicts of interest, complacency of investors and other market participants,
complexity of financial markets and of the securities traded therein, and the tragedy of the commons).
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